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EXTRATERRITORIAL SANCTIONS IN THE CANADA/U.S.
CONTEXT - A U.S. PERSPECTIVE
Arthur T. Downey
The United States is the Olympic champion of unilateral economic sanc-
tions. Our Canadian friends have their own economic sanctions programs,
some of which are stricter or more onerous than some of the U.S. sanctions.
One side or the other might, from time to time, finds the approach of the
other government to be short-sighted or ineffective. But, when the issue of
extraterritoriality arises within the context of a U.S. sanction program, it is
always a hot-button issue on the Canadian side.
Aside from often being inconsistent with international law, extraterritori-
ality is an unwanted intrusion into a country's sovereignty, and Canada
sometimes suffers nightmares about the firmness and durability of its own
sovereignty. It naturally bristles when the ugly head of extraterritoriality ap-
pears, especially if it is an American head. When it appears in the antitrust
context or a technical legal jurisdictional issue, it is relatively obscure and
somewhat less red-hot. But, when extraterritoriality arises in the context of
politically driven U.S. economic sanctions, the heat gets turned up to the
maximum because the perceived threat runs to the heart of sovereignty.
Emotions rise, and pride is engaged.
Note that I referred to "politically driven" sanctions, as opposed to those
based on serious and genuine national security concerns. National security-
related sanctions have traditionally been accommodated even if they con-
tained extraterritorial aspects. For example, the U.S. economic sanctions
against North Korea have long operated in a way that causes the United
States to reach Canadian companies owned or controlled by the United
States, but Canada, as a practical matter, has acquiesced. The U.S./Canadian
defense relationship is deep and long-standing; both countries fought to-
gether in Korea almost half a century ago, and there is virtually no trade by
either country with North Korea. These factors have made a practical ac-
commodation relatively easy.
The early U.S. sanctions against Cuba had a colorable - though not
overwhelming - claim to have national security implications. Their extrater-
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ritorial aspects were properly observed as abusive in Ottawa, but the two
governments showed some flexibility by 1975, and a practical accommoda-
tion was worked out.
In the early 1980s, the U.S. concern over the Soviet Siberian gas pipeline,
which had national security elements, produced U.S. unilateral economic
sanctions with clear extraterritorial problems that angered not only British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, but also our friends in Ottawa. After
some trans-Atlantic fuss, the United States finally found a way to save face
politically and let go of that tiger's tail when George Schultz became Secre-
tary of State.
Those days seem like ancient history in relation to the current spasm of
unilateral economic sanctions generated in Washington. In a study done
eighteen months ago at Georgetown University Law Center, it was discov-
ered that, during the four-year period 1993-1996, no less than sixty-one en-
actments authorized unilateral economic sanctions for broadly defined politi-
cal purposes (i.e., not as a tool in trade disputes). Thirty-five countries were
targeted by the United States, representing forty-two percent of the world's
population. These figures have been widely publicized in the United States
and elsewhere, and they certainly are ugly - suggesting a country whose for-
eign policy is wildly out of control. But, these figures are also misleading in
that most of them refer to actions other than a genuine economic sanction in
the sense of interdicting trade and investment. One of the sixty-one sanctions,
for example, was a law that directed that, in international financial institu-
tions, the United States vote against all loans to countries practicing female
genital mutilation.
Let us be more specific and more current. In the last three years, the
United States has taken eight steps:
1995 (March) Executive Order banned U.S. investment in Iranian
petroleum development;
(May) Executive Order prohibited all trade and investment
between the United States and Iran.
2
1996 (March) Legislation enhanced the Cuban embargo, the
dreaded Helms-Burton Act;3
(August) Legislation sanctioned non-U.S. companies that in-
vest in Iran and Libya's petroleum sector, the Iran-Libya
I Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995).
2 Exec. Order No. 12, 959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,755 (1995).
3 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton
Act), 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091 (West Supp. 1997) [hereinafter Helms-Burton].
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Sanctions Act (ILSA);4
.(September) Legislation authorized new investment sanc-
tions against Burma/Myanmar.5
1997 (May) Executive Order prohibited new investment in
Burma/Myanmar, 6
(August) Executive Order expanded Iran sanctions relating to
third country sales;7
(November) Executive Order imposed an embargo on U.S.
transactions with Sudan.
8
This year, we may see unilateral economic sanctions against countries
that persecute certain religions, as well as sanctions against Nigeria, Syria, or
Indonesia. Quite apart from these U.S. sanctions at the federal level, recent
years have seen a flood of unilateral economic sanctions imposed by states
and localities. Should the City of Oakland or the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts conduct their own foreign policy? Do they have a right to set their
own procurement policy that takes into account the overseas business plans
of their suppliers?
What has risen up, or broken down, in our body politic that permits or
demands these actions? I believe it is important, especially for our Canadian
friends, to understand what has happened and why. Understanding why this
has happened will not make the results less dumb as U.S. foreign policy, nor
will it make the extraterritorial aspects less neuralgic for Ottawa. But, it
might soften the anger and moderate the frustration.-
The best analysis of what has provoked this unhappy trend was made by
Jim Schlesinger in an article published last year in National Interest.9 Schle-
singer, you recall, was Secretary of Defense and of Energy, and he headed
the CIA in the 1970s. I will draw shamelessly from his analysis. He argues
that, despite the fact that America is the leading world power, the conclusion
of the Cold War has now revealed more clearly some of the inherent weak-
nesses of the American system. These include three general elements.
4 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996)
[hereinafter ILSA].
5 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act of 1996 § 567, Pub.
L. No. 104-107, 110 Stat. 704,708 (1996).
6 Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,299 (1997).
7 Exec. Order No. 13,059,62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (1997).
8 Exec. Order No. 13,067, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,987 (1997).
9 See generally James Schlesinger, Fragmentation and Hubris: A Shaky Basis for
American Leadership, NAT'L. IrREST 3, Sept. 22, 1997.
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The first of these is the sharp decline in the public's concern about for-
eign policy which has left the field open to domestic special interest groups
that have their own special axes to grind, unhindered by any commonly ac-
cepted vision of the national interest. Thus, domestic constituencies (ethnic
groups, mostly, but this also includes human rights groups, enviroimental-
ists, and other single-issue groups) have acquired an excessive influence over
our foreign policy. Our policies are created by hyphenated Americans: the
Armenian-Americans sanction Azerbaijan; Greek-Americans prevent trans-
fers to Turkey; the Cuban-Americans dominate our Cuban policy; and the
supporters of Israel totally determine our Middle East policy. More recently,
we have seen foreigners come to the United States as students or in other
capacities, and enlist the United States in their continued struggle against
conditions back home. The Internet has provided them with an effective
communication tool.
From the politician's viewpoint, foreign policy is simply another way of
building domestic political support and acquiring funds. Ethnic politics used
to be confined to urban areas, but now it has spilled over into foreign policy.
The high priests of "multiculturalism," who encourage ethnic consciousness-
raising serve to legitimize the demands of their constituencies by having
America's foreign policy back their special agendas
A second element is hubris. Being The Superpower has gone to our col-
lective heads. We are not bad - we do not have territorial ambitions - we just
want to instruct others how to behave. We have become something of an
international nag. The United States becomes offended and angry if others do
not join in our sanctions, and then we are tempted to reach extraterritorially
or with secondary boycotts which we used to repudiate as a matter of law. In
the process, we gratuitously antagonize others, especially our friends. This is
not the way to conduct foreign policy or to be the world's leader. We seem to
be able to punish, but not to prevail.
A third element of our weakness is our constitutional structure, especially
the primacy of the President in foreign affairs and the primacy of the Con-
gress in foreign trade matters. Lord Carrington observed to some friends at
the State Department during his last visit to the United States as NATO Sec-
retary General, "Of course, no one in Europe understands how your govern-
ment operates."' 0
Once again, the end of the Cold War has revealed the weakness in this
internal governance structure; there is less willingness on the part of Con-
gress to yield to the President, and more willingness on the President's part
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ecutive Order - to forestall worse legislation. Perhaps this is more pro-
nounced since the shift of congressional control to the opposition party. This
newly appreciated power of Congress has drawn the attention of ethnic and
special interest political organizations, and they seem more successful in
getting Congress to sign on to their foreign interest agenda.
One reason Congress and the President find that economic sanctions are
very appealing is that they seem to be without cost. Why risk a pilot's life in
a military response to a Cuban attack on unarmed U.S. planes when a seem-
ingly tougher embargo will do the trick without cost? Schlesinger says: "Im-
posing economic sanctions has come to appear a suitable response to virtu-
ally any problem, and their use is quickly becoming indiscriminate to the
point of promiscuity.""
It might be instructive to examine just one illustration of this sanction-
mania to see how the pressures form and how the players interact. The recent
U.S. sanctions against Burma/Myanmar are a good example, in part because
the stakes were relatively low, and because Burma was relatively insignifi-
cant. Let us take a look at how sausage is made.
Congress adopted a statement of U.S. policy toward Burma in legislation
enacted in September, 1996.12 The Senate drove the process, but, amazingly,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held no hearings or markup. The
Senate Banking Committee held a hearing, which lasted less than one hour,
where the only witnesses were Adele Lutz, an actress who played Aung San
Suu Kyi in a movie,13 and her husband. Neither the State Department nor the
CEO of Unocal, a company which had a one billion dollar investment in
Burma, were called upon to attend.
The legislative vehicle for the statement of U.S.-Burma policy was the
foreign operations portion of the appropriations bill. The Chair of the Foreign
Operations Subcommittee was Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), who had
taken it upon himself to be the champion of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel
Peace Prize winner living under house arrest in Yangon until mid-1995. He
threatened a full trade and investment embargo against Myanmar, including
disinvestment, but he settled for a ban on new investment in the face of
heavy lobbying from the Administration, the business community, and some
other senators.
Senator McConnell had legitimate desires to assist the democratic move-
ment in Burma, and he had concerns about repression by the military gov-
ernment. He was also pressured by human rights groups, largely student-led.
!I Id. at 7.
12 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Act of 1996, supra note
5.
13 BEYOND RANGOON (Columbia Pictures 1995).
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Interestingly, there was heavy involvement by Burmese students in the
United States, some of whom were connected by the Internet to their friends
in Burma and at the Thai border. Expressing outrage and feeling good were
important goals. Consideration of whether these sanctions might be effective
in achieving the stated goal of enhancing democracy in Burma was lacking.
McConnell was honest enough to note that this was a hard sell in the Senate
and on Main Street in Lexington, Kentucky, so he focused heavily on Burma
as the source of illegal opium. He failed to mention that the United States has
refused to provide counter-narcotics assistance to Burma, and that hundreds
of Burmese have been killed in their own fight against the narcotic traffick-
ers. He also failed to make a link between drugs and repression of democ-
racy.
When the Algerian military overturned freely held elections a couple of
years ago, the United States did not impose sanctions. Perhaps this was be-
cause the electoral winners were viewed as Muslim fundamentalists. China
eradicates political dissidents, in contrast to Burma, where opposition parties
are permitted, but the United States does not ban investment in China. In
Vietnam, where the United States subsidizes U.S. trade and investment, there
is no political dissent. When the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, was
asked about the evident inconsistency and hypocrisy in U.S. policy, she of-
fered a glib sound bite: "different strokes for different folks." She failed to
note that her State Department was dependent upon the money from Senator
McConnell's subcommittee.
The Administration formally imposed sanctions in May of 1997 in an
Executive Order based in part on a declaration of a National Emergency and
the invocation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.14 The
President declared formally that the "politics of the government of Burma
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States."' 5 There was no factual basis for that
finding, and, in my opinion, the invocation of the emergency was an abuse of
power. But, Congress looked the other way, and so do others.
What was the result of last year's sanctions against Burma? Because of
the poor timing of the U.S. announcement of sanctions, the Association of
South East Asian Nations felt it necessary to admit Burma to membership -
an embarrassing foreign policy defeat for the United States. U.S. companies
walked away from investments in Burma, turning them over to foreign com-
panies that rushed in behind. Contrary to U.S. long-term interests, the sanc-
tions had the perverse effect of strengthening China's hand in Burma. And,
14 Exec. Order 13,059, supra note 7.
15 Id. at 28,30 1.
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there were no political changes that can be traced directly to the U.S. sanc-
tions. The bottom line is that, as a result of this moral posturing, the United
States has isolated itself from Burma and has demonstrated that we do not
have the ability to isolate Burma from others. The good news is that Senator
McConnell and his colleagues seem to have forgotten about Burma, and thus
there are no serious calls for sanctions against foreign companies who con-
tinue to invest in Burma despite pressure from the United States. So far, ex-
traterritoriality has not successfully reared its head with respect to the sanc-
tions in Burma.
The two recent U.S. sanctions programs that have drawn the most com-
plaints from the government of Canada are the infamous Helms-Burton Act
16
and the Iran/Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA),17 both enacted in 1996. The com-
plaints charge the United States with once again engaging in extraterritorial-
ity.
I will not discuss the Helms-Burton Act in any depth, because I am un-
comfortable in raising a spirited defense of its most egregious provisions. I
believe it was a mistake and that the circumstances of its passage through
Congress and under the President's pen reflect a political cowardice and an
ignorance of international law. I tend to agree with the August 1996 report of
the Inter-American Juridical Committee, which concluded that, in certain
areas, the potential application of the law would not be in conformity with
international law. (The record should note that the key author of that opinion
was an official of the Canadian government, and that no U.S. government
official was involved.)
ILSA may be less well-known, and perhaps it requires a very brief expla-
nation. As a practical matter, the legislation was driven almost wholly by
domestic political concerns, and it was crafted and accomplished by the so-
called Israeli lobby during an election year. It was the analogue to the Helms-
Burton Actl, which was similarly driven by the so-called Cuban lobby in
America, and was accomplished in the wake of the attack by the Cuban
military on U.S. civilian aircraft.
Without regard to the domestic political driving forces, ILSA was born
out of frustration that our allies and friends were unwilling to restrict invest-
ment into Iran's petroleum sector - as the United States did in 1995. In the
U.S. view, Iran's economy was fragile, but development of its gas and oil
capacity would provide strength to Iran and give it the ability to acquire
weapons of mass destruction and the will to continue to engage in terrorist
acts. The Act forced non-U.S. companies to choose between the United
16 Helms-Burton, supra note 3.
17 ILSA, supra note 4.
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States and Iran. Specifically, today, if a Canadian company invests more than
twenty million dollars (U.S.) in Iran's petroleum development, the President
is required to impose two sanctions against that company. He has a choice of
six different sanctions. Most of the potential sanctions are merely the with-
holding of public benefits, such as the denial of EximBank loans to the sanc-
tioned Canadian company. None of the potential sanctions can legitimately
be charged with the dreaded extraterritoriality, even though many in Canada
and elsewhere hurl that charge. The law asserts no jurisdiction over Canada
or events in Canada.
Is ILSA a dumb law? Yes, and it is even dumber foreign policy. Are ele-
ments of it problematic under international law, including the element of the
issuance of a secondary boycott? Yes. Indeed, when I testified in the House
against ILSA, I urged that the International Relations Committee refrain from
marking up the bill unless, and until, it had sought and received a legal
opinion from the Attorney General on the bill's compatibility with interna-
tional law. My view was ignored.
Sometimes our friends abroad get a bit too excited about our alleged ex-
traterritorial sins, and sometimes they even sound like they are whining. In
the case of Canada and the Helms-Burton and ILSA laws, I hope our Cana-
dian friends will remain as practical as they usually are and recognize that,
extraterritorial theory aside, no one in Canada has been harmed by these
laws. On the other hand, theory and international law are important and can-
not be ignored. The Canadian "blocking" statutes are excellent measures to
protect Canadian interests. Canadian humor was also very effective when
Members of Parliament asserted pre-Revolutionary property claims against
the United States.
Canada has a special opportunity when situations like these two laws
exist. One of the reasons that Congress passes these laws targeting the be-
havior of non-U.S. companies and governments, and why the White House is
unwilling to veto them, is because there is a general perception that foreign
companies and their governments have sold themselves to the devil. The
French, we all know, want to make profits even if it means helping terrorist
countries. Russians are probably still Communists anyway; we know about
the "Asian values" of the Japanese, and so on. In contrast, most Americans
perceive Canadians as virtually indistinguishable from themselves. They are
the good guys who will stand up for justice and right at the expense of a few
dollars.
Therein is the opportunity. When Canada is confronted with an enactment
by the United States such as Helms-Burton or ILSA, I believe it is important
for the government of Canada to take the United States to court. Seek to ad-
judicate the issue as soon as possible in the most appropriate international
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forum, with respect and without whining. The European Union action within
the WTO against the United States was fair and appropriate, but was an
analogous one. (This assumes, of course, that during the legislative process
the Canadian side will communicate clearly its intentions in private to the
U.S. government.) Win or lose, such actions will be noticed by the U.S. pub-
lic, and they will not be dismissed as craven acts by money-driven foreign-
ers. This will be instructive for the U.S. public and ultimately might result in
some stiffening of the backs of our political leaders, and it might lead to the
derailment of such foolish means of achieving laudable foreign policy goals.
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